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THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF APPELLATE 
ADJUDICATION 
HEIDI LI FELDMAN
 
ABSTRACT 
This Article concerns two topics that, I hope to show, are vitally 
connected. One is the distinctive importance of appellate adjudication in 
the legal system of United States. The other is the working of entangled 
concepts in the law. This Article argues that courts engineer entangled 
legal concepts via appellate adjudication, and it is in this respect 
appellate adjudication is both crucial and unique, at least in the U.S. legal 
system. Entangled concepts intertwine description and evaluation. They 
also facilitate and constrain legal reasoning and legal judgments, in ways 
that distinguish legal adjudication from pure politics or the 
implementation of public policy. This article demonstrates more fully what 
it is for a legal concept to be entangled and how entanglement supplies 
guidance in adjudication. This Article carefully examines the background 
to MacPherson v. Buick and Justice Benjamin Cardozo‘s particular re-
engineering of ‗negligence‘ and ‗duty‘, entangled concepts belonging to 
the same legal taxonomy. This Article also examines how the United States 
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Supreme Court has engineered ‗commerce‘, itself an entangled concept, in 
order to show that conceptual engineering of entangled concepts occurs 
outside the context of state common law. The claims made here apply to 
appellate adjudication in any area of law. Whether we are dealing with 
private law, public law, common law, or statutory law, or Constitutional 
law, the defining feature of appellate adjudication is its continuous 
engineering and reengineering of entangled legal concepts. The merger of 
fact and value in these concepts explains both the fertility of appellate 
adjudication and some of the constraints judges work under when they 
work with legal concepts that entangle fact and value. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Appellate adjudication in the United States remains a poorly 
understood practice. People agree that it is not identical to administrative 
rulemaking or to the legislative process, but they no longer believe that 
appellate courts discover law rather than make it. Furthermore, too often 
people associate appellate adjudication with common law and particularly 
with private law, despite the fact that appellate courts address legal 
questions that arise from regulations, statutes, and the Constitution itself—
all generally regarded as quintessential areas of public, codified law. In 
order to appreciate the distinctiveness of appellate adjudication, this article 
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looks to a specific vital function characteristically performed by appellate 
courts: the engineering of entangled legal concepts.  
In entangled concepts, the descriptive and the evaluative are 
fundamentally interrelated such that when one aspect is reshaped so is the 
other.
1
 This provides a check on the malleability of legal concepts: insofar 
as one does not wish to disturb the evaluative point of a concept, one 
cannot unthinkingly modify its descriptive reach, and vice versa. In 
entangled legal concepts, the descriptive and the evaluative check and 
balance one another. However, entanglement does allow for the 
modification or reengineering of entangled legal concepts. As 
circumstances and values change, appellate courts can put these changes to 
work to redesign an entangled concept that has become outmoded. If the 
concept‘s evaluative point is obsolete, this will drive a modification in its 
descriptive reach that responds to a revised understanding of the relevant 
values. Likewise, if the descriptive reach of the concept no longer serves 
its evaluative point, courts can update the concept‘s situational range. In 
either case, though, the aspect of the concept undergoing revision must 
answer to the other aspect: the descriptive and evaluative cannot be 
understood or engineered independently of one another. 
 
 
 1. Contemporary philosophers have been reexamining concepts that blend description and 
evaluation ever since the 1985 publication of Bernard Williams‘ book ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Fontana Press, 1985). Williams contrasted ethically ―thick‖ concepts, which by virtue of 
being culturally embedded were both ―world-guided‖ and ―action-guiding.‖ Id. at 140–42, 150–52. 
Williams‘ own work had roots in mid-twentieth century work by Philippa Foot and G.E.M. Anscombe, 
both of whom questioned then current analytic philosophy‘s insistence upon strict separation of ‗is‘ 
from ‗ought‘ and ‗description‘ from ‗evaluation.‘ See G.E.M. Anscombe Modern Moral Philosophy, 
33 PHILOSOPHY 1–19 (1958); G.E.M. Anscombe, On Brute Facts, 18 ANALYSIS 69–72 (1958); 
Philippa Foot, Moral Arguments, LXVII MIND 502–13 (1958); Philippa Foot, Moral Beliefs, 59 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 83–104 (1958). After the publication of ETHICS AND 
THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY, a number of philosophers explored the relationship of description and 
evaluation, particularly when seemingly entwined in single concepts. See, e.g., Peter Railton, Red, 
Bitter, Good, in FACT, VALUES, AND NORMS, 131–47 (2003); Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, 
Morality and Thick Concepts, 66 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (SUPPLEMENTARY) 
267–99 (1992). 
 Philosopher Hilary Putnam approached the subject from a different slant than these philosophers 
in his 2002 book THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS (2004), itself 
based on his 2000 Rosenthal Lectures. Id. at 2. In this Article, I follow Putnam in applying the term 
―entangled‖ to concepts that resist reduction to discrete descriptive (fact) and evaluative (value) 
components. Id. at 28. 
 In publications predating Putnam‘s popularization of the term ―entangled concepts,‖ I referred to 
such concepts as ―blend concepts‖, arguing for their importance to a conception of objectivity relevant 
to law. Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1187 (1993). Very few 
legal scholars have attended carefully to the significance of concepts that blend or entangle description 
and evaluation. A recent exception is David Enoch and Kevin Toh, Legal as a Thick Concept, in THE 
NATURE OF LAW: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES (W.J. Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds. 
forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2122103. 
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The idea of entanglement can be difficult to grasp, even though 
entangled concepts are part of everyday thought as well as in specialized 
or professional areas of thought. For a preliminary example, let us take a 
conceptual realm rather removed from the legal. Consider concepts that 
simultaneously describe and evaluate comedy, e.g. ‗funny‘, ‗droll‘, ‗wry‘, 
‗silly‘, ‗ridiculous‘, ‗wacky‘, ‗antic‘, ‗absurd‘, and ‗witty‘. When applied, 
these concepts pinpoint particular breeds of comedy, each with a 
distinctive kind of humor deriving from particular settings and 
characteristics. Together, these concepts comprise a taxonomy of the 
comedic. When told that that a performance was ‗wry‘, one would be 
surprised to hear that it was a slapstick routine. Of course, there can be 
innovations in humor. Somebody might create a form of slapstick that is 
wry or droll, but in order for it to count as slapstick, it would still have to 
be humorous in the particular way that slapstick is. One cannot simply 
stipulate that one is performing slapstick. Slapstick is boisterous, rowdy, 
physical comedy. If that kind of comedy can be wry or witty, then 
slapstick can be wry or witty. If wryness or wit drives out the distinctive 
features of slapstick, one may still have comedy or humor, but it will no 
longer be slapstick.
2
 In comedy, no institutionalized body engineers the 
concepts that describe and evaluate different kinds. This lack of 
institutionalized oversight is true of most of our entangled concepts, 
including ethical ones.  
The body of this Article provides an extended analysis of two 
engineered entangled legal concepts. Such analysis provides the fullest 
insight into entanglement. What makes entangled legal concepts, and by 
extension law itself, distinct is that entangled legal concepts do not simply 
evolve and morph as part of a spontaneous process of development. 
Judges, with input from lawyers, actively engineer entangled legal 
concepts, shaping them so that they simultaneously describe and evaluate 
in one way rather than another. Judges do this by extending or limiting the 
situations in which entangled legal concepts apply by assigning them to 
taxonomies shot through with certain values rather than others. 
Understanding the specific entanglement in any concept that conjoins 
description and evaluation requires a tremendous amount of background 
knowledge—cultural, historical, sociological, anthropological, and 
 
 
 2. Note that even the concept ‗comedic‘ is itself entangled. The concepts that fall under its 
umbrella share both distinctive and evaluative features that make concepts comedic rather than, say, 
tragic. This resemblance between concepts subsidiary to a more global entangled concept occurs in all 
species of entangled concepts. So, entangled legal concepts will have in common features derived 
from ‗legal‘—itself an entangled concept. 
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psychological. Engineering entanglement calls for this knowledge too. The 
knowledge that enables us to use or understand the concept may now be 
tacit, but to appreciate judicial engineering we must make explicit the 
circumstances faced by the original appellate engineer. Through this 
process, we become more sensitive to today‘s appellate engineering of 
concepts, examining more carefully the underlying circumstances that 
influence how courts entangle description and evaluation within specific 
legal concepts, making them as discrete as ‗slapstick‘ or ‗drollery‘. 
Perhaps counter-intuitively, the only way to appreciate the discreteness 
and concomitant force of entangled legal concepts is to plunge into the 
nexus of description and evaluation that structures them, rather than trying 
to impose upon them a distinction between description and evaluation or 
examining them out of the context in which they have emerged. 
An analogy to another kind of entanglement may help here. In quantum 
mechanics, entanglement refers to the situation where the state of one 
object cannot be fully described without considering another.
3
 This 
situation exemplifies a quantum state. Quantum states make a complete, 
simultaneous description of all particles impossible, because describing an 
aspect of one part of a quantum system changes the description of the 
other in nondeterministic ways. In order to understand the quantum world, 
one must understand the relationship between entangled objects. 
Information about one part of an entangled state is irreducibly partial, so 
for a fuller picture, the entanglement itself must be appreciated.  
When courts engineer entangled concepts, they may start from either 
the descriptive or the evaluative aspect of the prior version of the concept. 
But as they develop one facet, the other always comes into play, shifting in 
response or making it impossible for a court to modify the first facet 
because such a shift renders the concept unworkable or unconvincing. 
Conceptual engineering of entangled concepts always involves both the 
descriptive and the evaluative aspects of such concepts, even when the 
engineer herself cannot specify in advance precisely how modifying one 
aspect will affect the other. Conceptual engineering remains an open-
 
 
 3. As Erwin Schrödinger, the first explorer of entanglement in quantum physics, described it: 
―When two systems, of which we know the states by their respective representatives, enter into 
temporary physical interaction due to known forces between them, and when after a time of mutual 
influence the systems separate again, then they can no longer be described in the same way as before, 
viz. by endowing each of them with a representative of its own. I would not call that one but rather the 
characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure from classical 
lines of thought. By the interaction the two representatives [the quantum states] have become 
entangled.‖ E. Schrödinger, Discussion of Probability Relations Between Separated Systems, 31 
MATHEMATICAL PROC. CAMBRIDGE PHIL. SOC‘Y 555 (1935) (emphasis added). 
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ended process, neither constrained nor static. To fully understand 
entangled concepts and how they get engineered calls for a focus on the 
entanglement that gives these concepts their particular content. 
In following sections, this article examines two examples of appellate 
engineering of entangled legal concepts: first, ‗negligence‘ in the litigation 
that leads to Justice (then Chief Judge) Benjamin Cardozo‘s decision in 
MacPherson v. Buick; and second, ‗commerce‘ in the line of Supreme 
Court cases that brought us to last Term‘s adjudication4 of the question of 
the facial constitutionality of the individual mandate in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Health Care Act.
5
 The in-depth analyses 
presented below further clarify the nature and workings of entangled 
concepts and demonstrate how appellate courts engineer, reengineer, and 
even dismantle them. This engineering is the defining feature of appellate 
review, whether that review occurs as consideration of common law, a 
statute, or an agency rule or regulation. The task is vital. Entangled legal 
concepts serve to simultaneously carve the world descriptively and 
evaluatively, enabling legal reasoning to proceed as parties navigate the 
way fact and value intertwine throughout the law. Some concepts 
engineered by appellate courts appear in statutes and regulations, 
sometimes because these legislative and administrative materials borrowed 
them from judicial opinions in the first place, and sometimes because 
courts become the engineers of concepts that first appeared in a statute, 
rule, or regulation. Whatever the source of the entangled legal concept, it 
is by working on it that appellate adjudication differs from other areas of 
legal process. 
Appellate judges can and do radically and consciously engineer and 
reengineer entangled concepts. No other legal actor effects change at such 
a foundational level and on such a routine and ongoing basis. Legislatures 
can, potentially, make sweeping structural changes—e.g., in labor 
relations or whether gays may be open about their sexual orientation while 
serving in the military. Furthermore, legislative law is overtly political or 
stipulative; it need not answer to a conceptual scheme that itself exerts 
developmental pressure on the concepts that comprise it.
6
 Appellate courts 
 
 
 4. Nat‘l Fed. of Indep. Bus. et al. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
 6. Some legislation, however, is drafted with entangled legal concepts. This type of statute is a 
natural candidate for the sort of change through appellate adjudication that occurs when law comes 
straight from adjudication. A full exploration of entangled concepts embedded in statutes and 
constitutions is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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shape the law differently. They work concept by concept, and must answer 
to the constraints imposed by the entangled concepts themselves. 
II. ENTANGLEMENT AND AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURER LIABILITY 
In order to clarify and explain entangled concepts, and how in the 
course of appellate adjudication they can be engineered, I begin with 
MacPherson v. Buick.
7
 When law students study this case, they learn that 
it stands for the elimination of the privity requirement (the requirement of 
contractual or quasi-contractual relationship) between an injured plaintiff 
and a maker of the defective product that injured him or her. For the 
purposes of the development of the law of products liability, this take-
away makes sense. But from the perspective of how New York‘s highest 
court reached its conclusion, this future oriented understanding is 
anachronistic. Looking forward from Cardozo‘s opinion, rather than 
backward to its particular underpinnings, misses some significant data 
important for understanding the engineering of entangled concepts,. 
Ultimately, that data provides insight into how appellate judges engineer 
concepts and a much richer understanding of the future effects of 
Cardozo‘s engineering in MacPherson. 
The central accomplishment of MacPherson in the context of its own 
time was the way Cardozo dispensed with two somewhat entangled 
concepts, ‗imminent danger‘ and ‗inherent danger,‘ so as to better engineer 
‗negligence‘, making its entanglement richer and arriving at a concept 
better suited to a world of emerging mass production.. Dispensing with the 
privity requirement made way for a full-fledged cause of action in 
negligence for product-related injuries, and the reason the action was so 
fully fledged was because of what the concept ‗negligence‘ meant after 
MacPherson. 
A. Before MacPherson: Thomas v. Winchester
 
Fifty years before MacPherson, another New York case, Thomas v. 
Winchester,
8
 first used ‗imminent danger‘ to permit a cause of action in 
negligence regardless of whether or not privity existed between the injured 
party and the seller of the harmful product. Thomas involved a similar fact 
pattern and yielded a similar legal outcome as MacPherson, yet it failed to 
introduce a properly engineered entangled concept that could clearly 
 
 
 7. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916). 
 8. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). 
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identify when to ignore the privity limitation on a negligence action 
involving a sale of goods. Instead, the Thomas court muddled the concept, 
which was not clarified until Cardozo‘s reengineering of ‗negligence‘ and 
‗duty‘. Like MacPherson, Thomas involved a sales chain of distribution 
that started before the manufacturer and included intermediaries other than 
the immediate retailer.Winchester was a wholesaler in medicinal herbs in 
New York City, and had bought out Gilbert, another wholesaler in 
medicinal herbs located in New York City.
9
 Winchester packaged jars of a 
medicinal herbal remedy—the product in this case—for distribution to 
retailers.
10
 Some of the herbs put into the jars were manufactured by 
Winchester on premises; others were bought from outside suppliers.
11
 
Before distribution, Winchester labeled the jars: ―prepared by A. 
Gilbert.‖12 
Mary Ann Thomas, the person injured by the extract in question, lived 
in upstate New York, in the town of Cazenovia, approximately 20 miles 
southeast from Syracuse and 175 miles northeast from New York City.
13
 
She had fallen ill.
14
 At the direction of her physician, Thomas‘s husband 
purchased what he believed was a medication based on dandelion.
15
 He 
bought it from a local retailer, Dr. Foord, who was a physician and 
druggist in Cazenovia.
16
 Dr. Foord dispensed the medicine from a jar 
labeled ―1/2 lb. dandelion, prepared by A. Gilbert, No. 108, John-street, 
N.Y.‖17 Dr. Foord had purchased this container from James A. Aspinwall, 
a druggist in New York City.
18
 Aspinwall, in turn, had purchased the 
container of medicine from Winchester.
19
 However, the actual extract in 
the jar was purchased from a supplier and was not manufactured by 
Winchester or Gilbert personally.
20
 
Upon taking the medicine, Mrs. Thomas suffered ―very alarming 
effects.‖21 This was because the jar did not contain dandelion but in fact 
 
 
 9. Id. at 405–06. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 406 (―The jars were labeled in Gilbert‘s name because he had been previously engaged 
in the same business on his own account . . . and probably because Gilbert‘s labels rendered the 
articles more salable‖). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 405. 
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contained belladonna, a poison.
22
 In extract form, dandelion and 
belladonna have similar outward characteristics, but experts can still 
distinguish them through ―careful examination.‖23 Although Mrs. Thomas 
suffered acutely, she survived. She and her husband sued Winchester, 
alleging negligence in mistaking belladonna for dandelion.
24
 
At trial Winchester moved for a nonsuit, primarily because ―the 
defendant was the remote vendor of the article in question: and there was 
no connection, transaction or privity between him and the plaintiffs, or 
either of them.‖25 The reasoning here could not be clearer: since the 
plaintiff had not dealt directly with the defendant, they were not connected 
so as to give rise to a duty of care on the defendant‘s part. The trial judge 
rejected the motion for nonsuit and a jury trial followed.
26
 The jury 
instructions charged that the jury should find for the plaintiff if they found 
Winchester to be negligent and the various middlemen not negligent.
27
 The 
plaintiff prevailed. 
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals, the state‘s highest court, 
began its analysis by making the question of privity determinative of 
whether the action could be brought: ―If, in labeling a poisonous drug with 
the name of a harmless medicine, for public market, no duty was violated 
by the defendant, excepting that which he owed to Aspinwall, his 
immediate vendee, in virtue of his contract of sale, this action cannot be 
maintained.‖28 The court began with the analysis of duty stated in 
Winterbottom v. Wright,
29
 where duty extends only between the parties to 
the contract and ―[m]isfortune to third persons, not parties to the contract, 
would not be a natural and necessary consequence of . . . negligence.‖30 
The court implies that negligence that does not naturally and necessarily 
produce injury in third parties is ―not . . . imminently dangerous to human 
life.‖31 
But the court then immediately relegated Thomas to a different 
category. Remarking that the ―defendant was a dealer in poisonous drugs,‖ 
the court pointed out the act of mislabeling belladonna would ―natural[ly] 
 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 406. 
 24. Id. at 405. 
 25. Id. at 406. 
 26. Id. at 407.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 407–08. 
 29. 10 Mees. & Welsb. 109. 
 30. 6 N.Y. at 408. 
 31. Id. 
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and almost inevitabl[ly]‖ lead to the death or grave injury ―of some 
person.‖32 The concept of ‗imminent danger‘ was the linchpin of the 
court‘s reasoning: 
In respect to the wrongful . . . character of the negligence 
complained of, this case differs widely from those put [forth] by the 
defendant‘s counsel. No such imminent danger existed in those 
cases. In the present case the sale of the poisonous article was made 
to a dealer in drugs, and not to a consumer. The injury therefore was 
not likely to fall on him, or on his vendee who was also a dealer; but 
much more likely to be visited on a remote purchaser, as actually 
happened. The defendant‘s negligence put human life in imminent 
danger. Can it be said that there was no duty on the part of the 
defendant, to avoid the creation of that danger by the exercise of 
greater caution? or that the exercise of that caution was a duty only 
to his immediate vendee, whose life was not endangered?
33
 
The court made clear that when a defendant creates imminent danger a 
duty of care arises in tort because of the likelihood of the danger 
occurring, and that a duty arises regardless of the contractual relation, or 
lack thereof, between the victim and the one who negligently created the 
danger. Indeed, the court appreciated that in an established chain of sales, 
a contractual transaction with somebody other than the victim might be 
one of the steps that renders the fruition of the harm even more likely. The 
court stated: 
The defendant‘s duty arose out of the nature of his business and the 
danger to others incident to its mismanagement. Nothing but 
mischief like that which actually happened could have been 
expected from sending the poison falsely labeled into the market; 
and the defendant is justly responsible for the probable 
consequences of the act. The duty of exercising caution in this 
respect did not arise out of the defendant‘s contract of sale to 
Aspinwall. The wrong done by the defendant was in putting the 
poison, mislabeled, into the hands of Aspinwall as an article of 
merchandise to be sold and afterwards used as the extract of 
dandelion, by some person then unknown. . . . The defendant‘s 
contract of sale to Aspinwall does not excuse the wrong done to the 
 
 
 32. Id. at 408–09. 
 33. Id. at 409–10. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
 
2012] THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF APPELLATE ADJUDICATION 71 
 
 
 
 
plaintiffs. It was a part of the means by which the wrong was 
effected.
34
 
Thus, the Thomas court distinguished the basis for contract liability from 
tort liability for personal injury from a product. The court‘s reasoning 
seems to do more than carve out an exception to the privity rule that 
permits a case to be won on negligence; its basis for holding the defendant 
liable resembles more of a preliminary theory of strict product liability for 
an industrialized society. If taken to its logical end, Thomas v. Winchester 
could have had the effect MacPherson did. On one reading, the case 
simply dispenses with the privity requirement as a prerequisite for 
bringing a negligence suit against a product manufacturer. However, this 
is not how courts between Thomas and MacPherson did read the case. 
Instead, they read Thomas as creating a limited exception to the otherwise 
ongoing assumption that only one in privity with a manufacturer could sue 
that manufacturer in negligence for compensation for personal injuries.  
B. Privity, Sales, Personal Injury 
The concept of ‗privity‘ comes from contract law, defined by the 
dictionary as follows:  
[P]rivity 1. The connection or relationship between two parties, 
each having a legally recognized interest in the same subject matter 
(such as a transaction, proceeding, or piece of property); mutuality 
of interest <privity of contract>. . . . privity of contract. The 
relationship between the parties to a contract, allowing them to sue 
each other but preventing a third party from doing so.
35
 
Prior to industrial production of complicated products with widespread 
distribution via various wholesalers and retailers, privity tracked the sort 
of connections and obligations tort law aimed to capture with negligence. 
The concept of privity brought to sales an evaluative-descriptive tangle 
epitomized by the principle of caveat emptor. Caveat emptor—buyer 
beware—was a mainstay of the traditional common law of sales. It 
presupposed a world in which the buyer of goods bore the burden of 
understanding their benefits and risks and deciding whether to purchase 
them and at what price in light of both. The buyer had an obligation to 
collect whatever information she needed to arrive at a sensible trade-off. 
 
 
 34. Id.  
 35. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1320 (9th ed. 2009). 
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This presupposed that the information about the nature of goods was either 
obvious to buyers or readily obtainable by them. And this would be the 
case when the seller of the good was also its maker, because in the course 
of the sales transaction, the buyer could ask questions or investigate the 
product. When products were neither complex nor novel, the buyer could 
rely on his or her own background knowledge to assess the product's 
safety and likelihood of defect, or at least use that knowledge to query the 
seller. The buyer was responsible for protecting himself against the risks 
of an ill-made product, either by refusing to buy it if he detected a defect 
or bargaining for a lower price if he doubted the soundness of the 
particular item. If, however, the item was negligently made and the 
bargain between buyer and seller presupposed that it was not, privity not 
only permitted the buyer to bring a cause of action, but also required the 
seller to take responsibility for the faulty item and the injuries it caused. 
The contractual connection tracked—arguably even gave rise to—the 
obligation in corrective justice. 
With the rise of modern manufacturing and distribution practices, the 
tangle of facts and values embedded in ‗privity‘ no longer addressed the 
circumstances of personal injury and the demands of corrective justice. 
Hence cases likes Thomas v. Winchester, where the court introduced 
‗imminent danger‘ as a way to override the application of the privity 
requirement on the ground that a manufacturer who made available an 
imminently dangerous product—e.g., a mislabeled poison—had an 
obligation in corrective justice to the person who was among those who 
would foreseeably suffer injury from imbibing the mislabeled medication. 
But the Thomas court did not explicitly dispense with privity, and the 
concept of privity continued to exert influence on the law of personal 
injury in New York. If the privity requirement applied, third parties were 
estopped from bringing actions for negligence. If on the other hand a 
product that caused an injury could be cast within the concept of imminent 
danger, the privity requirement fell away. Thus, a third party negligently 
injured by that product could recover. As a result, contentious cases turned 
on whether any given product was covered by the concept ‗imminently 
dangerous‘. Such cases came up frequently. Litigants debated the status of 
shop tools steam,
36
 scaffolding,
37
 and coffee urns.
38
 Likewise, the trial 
court and lower appellate courts in MacPherson v. Buick supposed that the 
 
 
 36. Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873). 
 37. Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (N.Y. 1882). 
 38. Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478 (1909). 
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case would turn on whether or not Mr. MacPherson‘s Buick was 
imminently dangerous. 
Instead, MacPherson v. Buick ultimately demonstrated that 
‗imminently dangerous‘ was not a concept adequately structured to specify 
situations where ‗privity‘ was inapt and liability should be found. 
Similarly, it determined that the concept of imminent danger could not 
mediate the tension that had arisen between ‗privity‘ and ‗negligence,‘ 
both entangled concepts themselves. Mr. MacPherson had a contract, and 
therefore a mutuality of interest in the transaction, with the dealer who 
sold him his Buick. In turn, the dealer had a similarly structured contract 
with Buick, the car manufacturer. But privity did not exist between Mr. 
MacPherson and the manufacturer, who never engaged in a direct 
transaction. Consequently, MacPherson could not sue the manufacturer. 
Moreover, despite his serious injuries, he could not sue the dealer who had 
sold him the car. While he and the dealer did transact directly, the dealer‘s 
sale to MacPherson did not involve negligence. If privity controlled, the 
case was a non-starter, an easy one, and MacPherson would go 
uncompensated for his losses. If, however, MacPherson could establish 
that the Buick was negligently made and that a negligently made 
automobile belonged within the concept of imminently dangerous, he 
could have succeeded in his action.  
C. MacPherson v. Buick: Early Stages 
As noted in the Introduction, appreciating a now well-entrenched piece 
of appellate engineering requires a detailed understanding of the state of 
affairs prior to the appellate court‘s accomplishment of that engineering. 
This section of the article explores how the circumstances and legal status 
of the case appeared to the lower courts that adjudicated MacPherson‘s 
personal injury claim against Buick. 
The first round in MacPherson v. Buick (MacPherson I) began with a 
trial that ended at the conclusion of the plaintiff‘s evidence, when the trial 
judge granted defendant‘s motion for a nonsuit.39 The first trial judge ruled 
that, as a matter of law, MacPherson could not win because his evidence 
did not establish anything that would exempt his case from the privity 
limitation. On appeal, MacPherson argued that New York had created an 
exception to the applicability of ‗privity‘. Specifically, he argued that if 
the concept ‗inherently dangerous‘40 extended to a particular product, this 
 
 
 39. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 153 A.D. 474, 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912). 
 40. Although Buick eventually attempts to distinguish between ‗inherently dangerous‘ and 
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trumped the application of ‗privity‘, thereby permitting recovery by third 
parties for injuries caused by the inherently dangerous product. The New 
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Division extensively 
reviewed the trial record, and decided that the plaintiff had met his burden 
of proof on the matter of defect in the wheel of the Buick he owned.
41
 The 
reviewing court then spoke to the conceptual matter at stake: 
An accident (similar to the one that did happen) in the streets of any 
city might easily injure many persons other than the immediate 
occupants of the automobile. An accident at the place in question, 
the approach to a populous village, a summer resort, in the month of 
July, when people were accustomed to go to that village as a health 
resort or for pleasure in considerable numbers, might easily be 
attended with serious injury to other automobile users of the 
highway, or persons walking thereon or driving thereon with horses 
and wagons, so that the use which it was intended that this 
automobile should be put to was a public use, to be used upon the 
highways which were open to all the people. The automobile was 
likely to be used in a city or populous village or upon State roads 
much frequented by automobile users and other people, and hence 
the injuries that might be apprehended from manufacturing and 
selling an insecure vehicle, a vehicle composed of inferior, untested 
materials, would be to other people as well as to the actual 
occupants of the car.
42
 
This passage resonates with the reasoning of Thomas v. Winchester. The 
appellate court explicitly introduced a worldview that countered the one of 
caveat emptor and its associated entangled concepts. At the center of this 
world was anonymously created risk, ―an accident in the streets of any 
city,‖ capable of wounding people gathered there and causing ―[i]njur[y] 
[to] many persons other than the immediate occupants of the 
automobile.‖43 The court noted that cities are known gathering places, with 
attractions that draw people toward potential danger, and this case 
involved ―a populous village, a summer resort, in the month of July, when 
people were accustomed to go to that village as a health resort or for 
 
 
‗imminently dangerous‘ appliances, the courts use the terms interchangeably and always in the sense 
of ‗imminently dangerous‘ as shaped by Thomas v. Winchester. 
 41. MacPherson, 153 A.D. at 476–77. 
 42. Id. at 477–78. 
 43. Id. at 477. 
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pleasure in considerable numbers.‖44 The court pictured public streets 
bustling with people, horses, and wagons; all of whom could be injured by 
one defective automobile. Such injury would come as no surprise, given 
the risk created.  
With this imagery as preface, the appellate court turned to precedent. It 
chose Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co.
45
 as the definitive case on point. Decided in 
1908 by New York‘s first level appellate division, Statler v. Ray permitted 
the plaintiff to recover damages for personal injures caused by a defective 
commercial coffee urn that exploded, scalding bystanders.
46
 Although one 
of the bystanders was the purchaser of the urn (and therefore in privity 
with the seller), the other was not.
47
 The MacPherson I court found that 
the Statler court permitted recovery because the urn-manufacturer knew 
how the urn would be used and the risks it presented.
48
 According to the 
MacPherson I court, Statler left open only ―the question whether a 
manufacturer and vendor of such an inherently dangerous appliance as this 
was may be made liable to a third party‖ on a theory of negligence.49 After 
a string of cites taken from the Statler opinion, the MacPherson I court 
concluded that negligence was an acceptable theory of recovery for 
damages, and it remanded the case for a new trial, rejecting the original 
nonsuit.
50
 
Following Statler, the MacPherson I court emphasized the concept of 
‗inherent danger‘ in deciding that the privity limitation on liability would 
not apply to an appliance or a machine. The MacPherson I court did not 
explicitly state reasons for this effacement of privity, relying instead on 
specifying the circumstances under which the automobile was used and 
the foreseeability—from the manufacturer‘s point of view—of injury to 
third parties if the vehicle were composed of ―inferior, untested‖ 
materials.
51
 Not surprisingly, when the case on remand went to trial, the 
evidence presented spoke primarily to the question of whether the wooden 
wheel on Mr. MacPherson‘s Buick was made with poor quality wood and 
to whether the wheel could or should have been inspected by Buick for the 
quality of the wood in its spokes. The plaintiff also presented evidence as 
 
 
 44. Id. at 477. 
 45. Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 125 A.D. 69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908), rev‘d on other grounds, 195 
N.Y. 478 (1909). 
 46. MacPherson, 153 A.D. at 478. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 478–79. 
 51. Id. at 477–79. 
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to his damages. The defendant‘s evidence focused on whether the plaintiff 
had driven carelessly. 
The time and setting of the new trial influenced the findings of fact that 
became part and parcel of ‗negligence‘ as ultimately re-engineered by 
Cardozo. In the early 1900s, cars were still relatively uncommon and what 
may now seem like short distances took hours to travel. MacPherson 
himself lived and worked in the small Village of Galway,
52
 just over 
seventeen miles from both Saratoga Springs and Schenectady, which were 
far larger towns also in upstate New York. A team of horses pulling a 
carriage travelled at eight to ten miles per hour.
53
 To put this in 
perspective, when Mr. MacPherson traveled the seventeen miles to 
Schenectady to buy his Buick, the journey would have taken roughly two 
hours by horse and carriage. 
At Close Bros., in Schenectady, MacPherson purchased a 1910 Buick 
Model 10 Runabout, with a four-cylinder, twenty-two and a one-half 
horsepower engine.
54
 The 1910 Runabout was Buick‘s first big market 
success, although automobiles had slowly begun to trickle into the market 
starting in the mid-1890s.
55
 The Model 10 Runabout hit the market two 
years after Ford‘s Model T.56 Buick‘s sales did not exceed 40,000 cars per 
year until 1910, spurred by the Model 10‘s popularity.57  
So, although car sales were picking up at the end of the first decade of 
the twentieth century, Mr. MacPherson was still something of an early 
adopter. His business made owning a car particularly attractive to him. At 
the time of the trial, he had worked for thirty-eight years as a stonecutter 
and gravestone designer as well as a dealer in ―monuments‖ and 
gravestones.
58
 In order to sell and deliver his work, he needed to travel 
through a ―large range of territory.‖59 After purchasing the car in May, 
1910, MacPherson and his son began using it for the monument business. 
 
 
 52. Case on Appeal at 45:16, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916), reprinted in 
1 RECORDS AND BRIEFS OF LANDMARK BENJAMIN CARDOZO OPINIONS 15 (William H. Manz ed., 
2001). 
 53. Timetable for the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad, 1859, LEARN NC, http://www.learn 
nc.org/lp/editions/nchist-antebellum/4828 (last visited Aug. 29, 2012). 
 54. Case on Appeal, supra note 52, at 46: 16. 
 55. AACA Museum Collection, AACA MUSEUM, http://www.aacamuseum.org/exhibitions/perm 
anent.aspx (last visited Aug. 29, 2012). 
 56. Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: MacPherson v. Buick and the Emergence of a Mass 
Consumer Market, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2005). 
 57. The Buick Automobile 1910–1919 & The Buick Motor Car Co., AMERICAN-AUTO 
MOBILES.COM, http://www.american-automobiles.com/Buick-1910-1919.html (last visited Aug. 29, 
2012). 
 58. Case on Appeal, supra note 52, at 15: 44. 
 59. Id. at 15–16: 44–45. 
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When winter came, MacPherson stored the car in his barn, where it was 
dry and protected from the elements.
60
 
When spring came, MacPherson resumed use of the automobile, 
sometimes driving it for days at a time, at others leaving it idle while he 
worked in his shop. One day that summer, MacPherson drove the car not 
for business purposes, but to assist a friend, Charles Carr, whose brother, 
John, needed to go the hospital in Saratoga Springs. John had a serious 
injury to his hand that, combined with infection, incapacitated him for 
work on his farm.
61
 
On the way to Saratoga, after picking up the Carrs, MacPherson 
stopped at Ballston Spa for gasoline. After this stop, John, who was in 
pain, sat in the front beside MacPherson, and Charles sat in the rumble 
seat behind them. After driving a bit, MacPherson felt the ―hind end of the 
machine skid.‖62 MacPherson testified that he was driving fifteen or 
sixteen miles per hour at that time. As the car slipped, MacPherson ―threw 
off the power‖ and attempted to steer out of the skid.63 Having done so, he 
proceeded to move to the middle of the road and restarted the car, steering 
to the right side of the road. As MacPherson moved to the right, he heard a 
crash and felt the rear of the car swerve to the left.
64
 He looked over his 
shoulder and ―saw the end of the machine swing around.‖65 As the car 
spun, MacPherson realized that he was heading toward a telegraph pole 
just a couple of yards away. In an effort to avoid crashing the radiator of 
the car directly into the pole, MacPherson steered the car away from the 
pole, and ended up striking it on an angle. The car then swung around the 
pole and rolled over.
66
 
The flip pinned MacPherson face down under the ―hind axle of the 
machine,‖ with the weight of the axle on his back.67 MacPherson asked the 
others, who he had not yet heard, to get the car off his back. Charles told 
him he was trying to ―lif[t] all he could, but couldn‘t stir it.‖68 Apparently, 
Charles succeeded, because shortly thereafter, MacPherson was freed. 
Using his uninjured hand, John Carr had managed to help Charles lift the 
car, even though John was ―in such pain that he didn‘t know what he was 
 
 
 60. Id. at 16–17: 47–48. 
 61. Id. at 20: 57. 
 62. Id. at 18: 51–52. 
 63. Id. at 18: 53. 
 64. Id. at 19: 54. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 19: 55–56. 
 67. Id. at 20: 57. 
 68. Id. at 20: 58. 
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doing.‖69 MacPherson crawled out, and despite being ―dazed . . . more so 
than [he] knew,‖ he switched off the engine and hailed some people who 
had heard the crash from a road nearby.
70
 They took MacPherson and the 
Carrs to the hospital at Saratoga Springs.
71
 
MacPherson‘s injuries were extensive. He had cuts about his head, his 
right eye was ―torn apart entirely, laid down from the eye brow.‖ He also 
had a badly hurt back, his left leg was bruised, especially around the knee 
and ankle, he had a broken right wrist, and fractured ribs.
72
 He received 
stitches for a cut beside his right ear and another fourteen stitches 
elsewhere on his head. Despite the extent of the injuries, MacPherson 
remained in the hospital for only a few hours.
73
 He ―got a man from the 
garage to take a machine and carry [him] home.‖74 
MacPherson arrived home with his arm in a sling, his eye dressed but 
painful, and dressings on the stitches.
75
 The next day he contacted a doctor 
in Galway, Dr. Parent, who attended MacPherson for 24 days, during 
which MacPherson was confined to his house.
76
 Dr. Parent visited every 
day.
77
 At first, MacPherson remained close to bed, even though ―the bed 
was very painful.‖78 He testified, ―I was broken up so I couldn‘t stay there. 
I couldn‘t sleep.‖79 After about a month, MacPherson made it to the porch 
of his home. On Labor Day, he went to Saratoga Springs to collect the 
wrecked Buick.
80
 
The effects of MacPherson‘s injuries lingered. The fractured ribs and 
broken wrist caused the ‗worst trouble‘ for his pain during the winter 
following the accident.
81
 To rehabilitate his hand, MacPherson spent the 
winter attempting to flex his wrist against the walls and doors of his house 
and he sawed and split wood to strengthen his arm.
82
 Despite these efforts, 
at the time of the trial, two years after the accident, MacPherson‘s right 
 
 
 69. Id. at 20: 58. 
 70. Id. at 21: 60–61. 
 71. Id. at 21: 61. 
 72. Id. at 21: 61, 22: 65. 
 73. Id. at 21: 61–62. 
 74. Id. at 22: 63. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 22: 63–64. 
 77. Id. at 22: 63. 
 78. Id. at 22: 64. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 24: 71. 
 81. Id. at 22–23: 65–66. 
 82. Id. at 23: 66–67. 
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wrist was still stiff. He reported: ―[I] [h]aven‘t much use of it. The grip is 
not good. There isn‘t much strength in it.‖83 
MacPherson was right handed and he needed his hand to letter and lay 
out the work on the monuments and gravestones with which he worked.
84
 
At that time, lettering was done either by hand with a chisel and hammer 
or with a pneumatic tool.
85
 Both methods became extremely difficult for 
MacPherson. ―The effect of using the hammer is very bad in the case of 
the hand hammer. With the pneumatic tool it is bad, you have to twist your 
hand so much, that is, the motion of the hand is restricted.‖86 Eventually, 
MacPherson recovered sufficiently to be able to grip the hand hammer 
without his hand cramping too much to hold on to it.
87
 
His eyesight was another matter. Although he had worn glasses prior to 
the accident, his eyesight was fairly good. After the accident, he could no 
longer find glasses to correct his vision.
88
 His right eye failed quickly, 
after having been shut and bandaged for two months after the accident.
89
 
During this period, vision in MacPherson‘s left eye also began to 
deteriorate, and by the time of the second trial, MacPherson could not ―tell 
people in the middle of street,‖ and he could not find glasses to correct the 
problem.
90
 
On cross-examination, Buick‘s lawyer tried to assert that MacPherson 
was driving at an unsafe fast speed at the time of the accident. Against this 
suggestion, MacPherson explained that while on the local road between 
Galway and Ballston, he ―went at an ordinary road gait,‖91 twelve to 
fourteen miles per hour. Then, when en route to Saratoga Springs from 
Ballston, the road switched to ―good, new macadam,‖92 but he went no 
more than twenty to twenty-five miles per hour.
93
 After the skid that 
preceded the car‘s breakdown, he slowed to fifteen miles an hour. 
MacPherson‘s reference to ―road gait‖ sounds odd to the modern ear. But 
―gait,‖ as in a horse‘s gait, was still a natural way of speaking of pace in 
1913. Horses and wagons were relevant frames of reference for thinking 
about travel and how to travel safely. 
 
 
 83. Id. at 23: 66. 
 84. Id. at 23: 67–68. 
 85. Id. at 23: 68. 
 86. Id. at 23: 68–69. 
 87. Id. at 24: 69. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 31. 
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The testimony of John Carr, MacPherson‘s passenger, also adds to our 
sense of the relationship between people and cars in upstate New York in 
1911. John, a farmer, was twenty-five years old at the time of the accident. 
He reported that he felt the rear of the car slide when it first skidded. He 
could not answer whether this was a slight skid or not because, as he 
explained, ―I never rode in [an automobile] very much.‖94 Later, when 
Buick‘s counsel tried again to establish that MacPherson was driving too 
quickly when the accident occurred, John could not speak to the question, 
saying only ―I don‘t know much about the speed of an automobile. I 
haven‘t ridden but three or four times in my life.‖95 He did say that twenty 
to twenty-five miles per hour was too fast for him and that he knew 
Macpherson was not driving higher than that speed at the time of the 
accident because he did not feel that the car was going too fast.
96
 
Buick‘s attorney also questioned Charles Carr, the other passenger, 
about the events surrounding the accident. Charles was twenty-eight years 
old at the time, three years older than his brother.
97
 Charles began his 
testimony by stating he was a farmer, a neighbor of MacPherson. Charles 
testified that just prior to the accident, he felt the skid to the left, ―just as 
though the car swung to the left slightly, a slight skidding, of the hind 
part.‖98 Next, as ―Mr. MacPherson pulled ahead of the skid,‖ Charles ―felt 
the hind end go down and a sound like wood breaking. . . . It sounded like 
a lot of wood breaking. . . . I could feel the car lower, the hind end; that 
was the left hind wheel.‖99 Pressed by Buick‘s counsel regarding the speed 
at which MacPherson was driving at the time of the accident, Charles 
explicitly couches the pace in terms of a horse‘s speed: ―If a horse would 
go eight miles an hour we wouldn‘t be moving that fast.‖100 
Because of the similarities between horse-drawn transportation and 
automobiles, MacPherson was able to establish the defectiveness of his 
car‘s left rear wheel. His attorney did not have to rely solely on Charles 
Carr‘s report of the sound of breaking wood. When MacPherson was able 
to collect his car at Saratoga Springs, the wreckage was incomplete, and 
had changed hands and location several times. He was, however, able to 
obtain the remains of the car‘s wheels, which were later used as exhibits at 
 
 
 94. Id. at 40: 119. 
 95. Id. at 42: 123. 
 96. Id. at 42: 123–24. 
 97. Id. at 43: 127. 
 98. Id. at 44: 129. 
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 100. Id. at 47: 138. 
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the trial.
101 At trial, MacPherson‘s attorney called upon experienced 
carriage and wheel makers for their opinions as to the wheels‘ 
appropriateness for road travel. Some of the experts had worked on both 
carriage and automobile wheels.
102
 Each had worked at least twenty years 
in the business; a couple had worked close to forty years.
103
 
These tradesmen agreed that the spokes in the wheel were of inferior 
hickory wood. They explained that they could tell primarily because of the 
way the spokes snapped squarely off, rather than coming apart and leaving 
behind ―brooming.‖104 The witnesses surmised that the wood from which 
the spokes had been made had not been left to dry or ―season‖ naturally, in 
the open air.
105
 Some thought a kiln had been used, and they explained 
how kiln drying made the wood brittle and prone to snap.
106
 They also 
explained what they looked for in wood they used to make wheels, how 
they examined the grain on a spoke to tell its quality.
107
 The expert 
witnesses informed the court that the only way to examine a spoke‘s 
quality thoroughly would be to look at the ends and at the side, and that if 
the side were covered with paint, some would have to be scraped away to 
make a full examination.
108
 If, however, the spoke were coated only in oil, 
to protect it, it could still be examined.
109
 
One additional witness testified regarding the testing of automobile 
parts. Otto Kleinfelder was ―an automobile expert by occupation.‖110 
Kleinfelder worked for the Thomas Car Company in Buffalo, where for 
nine years he was a ―tester.‖111 Kleinfelder explained that the Thomas Car 
Company purchased its wheels from the Salisbury Wheel Company, 
which delivered the wheels ―in their natural wood . . . so that it would give 
our inspectors a chance to look them over when they were received in the 
Receiving Department.‖112 From the receiving department, Kleinfelder 
 
 
 101. Id. at 25–26: 74–75. 
 102. See id. at 50: 148 (testimony of George A. Palmer, a thirty-year veteran of the carriage 
building and repair trade, who had worked on automobile wheels and carriages). 
 103. See id. at 57: 169 (testimony of Adelbert Payne, a carriage builder for twenty-two years). 
Payne, like Palmer, had worked on both carriage and automobile wheels. Id. at 58: 171. See also id. at 
72: 214 (testimony of James P. Tittlemeore, who testified to having been a carriage maker and general 
repairer for thirty-eight years). 
 104. See id. at 51: 150–51, 52: 154–55, 53: 156, 59: 175–76. 
 105. See id. at 53: 154–55. 
 106. Id. at 80: 237–39, 81: 240–42. 
 107. Id. at 82: 245, 90: 268–69. 
 108. Id. at 62: 184, 82: 243. 
 109. Id. at 64: 189–90. 
 110. Id. at 92: 275. 
 111. Id. at 92–93: 275–76, 94: 279. 
 112. Id. at 93: 276. 
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explained, the wheels went to the wheel department, where each one was 
tested using hydraulic pressure.
113
 After the cars were assembled, Thomas 
Carr gave each one a road test of 80 to 100 miles on rough roads.
114
 
Kleinfelder‘s testimony established consistency between one auto-maker‘s 
testing practices and the information supplied by the wheelmakers‘ 
testimony. 
The expert witness testimony constitutes the better part of the evidence 
MacPherson‘s counsel submitted at trial. Shortly after it was given, the 
plaintiff rested and the defendant sought a nonsuit. Eight grounds were put 
forth,
115
 most significantly the following: Buick noted that it was not in a 
contractual relationship with MacPherson,
116
 and that MacPherson had 
presented no evidence of fraud;
117
 Buick stressed that even if the car were 
inherently dangerous, MacPherson was contributorily negligent for not 
driving more slowly;
118
 Buick claimed that MacPherson had neither 
established an automobile manufacturer industry custom of checking for 
defective wheels nor a feasible way for manufacturers to do so;
119
 Buick 
also maintained that ―whatever obligation existed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff, must find its foundation in the fact that the defendant‘s car was in 
its nature an article eminently dangerous to life and property,‖120 and that 
the plaintiff had not established such a foundation. In short, Buick asserted 
the privity limitation, claimed that any exception based on imminent 
danger was moot because of the plaintiff‘s contributory negligence, and 
that, at the end of the day, plaintiff had not established any negligence on 
Buick‘s part. The court refused to nonsuit the plaintiff and also rejected 
defendant‘s motion to direct the jury to find for it.121 
Buick‘s grounds for its motions indicate its own trial strategy as the 
proceedings unfolded. To rebut plaintiff‘s case regarding Buick‘s 
negligence in manufacture or inspection, Buick put on experts from 
academia and the automobile industry, mainly engineers, who attempted to 
discredit the plaintiff‘s experts regarding the quality of the hickory in the 
wheel and the relative ease by which an automobile manufacturer could 
check that quality. 
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Buick‘s first witness was neither a working carriage wheel maker nor 
an automobile ―tester.‖ The witness, W.K. Hatt, described himself and his 
career as follows: 
I am professor of Civil Engineering and director of the laboratory of 
testing material of Pardue [sic] University at Lafayette, Indiana. I 
graduated from the University of New Brunswick, in 1887, then 
from Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., in 1891, with the degree of 
Civil Engineer. . . . The science of applied mechanics deals with 
motion and action of force and the application of force, respecting 
the strain and determination of strength.
122
 
Professor Hatt went on to explain at some length that throughout his career 
he had been involved in a federal government project to identify the grades 
and strengths of various woods from forests throughout the United 
States.
123
 Not surprisingly, this expert disagreed with the plaintiffs‘ experts 
as to how best to evaluate whether hickory was suited for purposes of 
making a car wheel.
124
 Professor Hatt even performed an in-court 
demonstration of his preferred method: the end of one of the spokes was 
planed off, and the witness counted the rings per inch, and said that, at 
least by this measure, the hickory was ―first-class mechanical hickory.‖125 
Professor Hatt disputed the methods of assessment used by plaintiff‘s 
experts, insisting that the he knew ―of no means of ascertaining the quality 
of hickory, aside from the rings and the weight.‖126 Professor Hatt then 
refrained from answering questions about automobile wheels in particular 
and automobile skids and their effects on wheels, claiming that these 
matters lay outside his expertise.
127
 Finally, Professor Hatt gave reasons 
for doubting the usefulness of a hydraulic pressure test on automobile 
wheels. He claimed that any such test would only be telling if the wheel 
were subjected to enough pressure to break it during the test.
128
 
Upon cross-examination, Professor Hatt denounced the plaintiffs‘ 
experts, claiming that one cannot gauge the weight of hickory accurately 
by hefting it in one‘s hand.129 He also claimed that nobody could, as an 
expert, ―pass judgment, as to whether twelve spokes assembled here, as 
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this was, that would ordinarily break off as square as these; were sound 
hickory or fit to be used in spokes.‖130 After making these assertions, 
Professor Hatt continued to testify at length under cross-examination, with 
the primary effect of limiting his opinion so narrowly that it did not 
address the question of the quality of the wheel at all. 
Subsequent defense witnesses focused on the condition of the road at 
the time of the accident and the speed at which they thought MacPherson 
was driving. This testimony went on, at some length, to support the 
contributory negligence theory advanced by the defendant. Defense 
counsel also returned to the questions of whether automobile companies 
customarily inspected wheels for the quality of the wood used in their 
spokes, and whether the manufacturer could reasonably inspect for this.
131
 
At the close of arguments, each side submitted proposed jury 
instructions to the court. Buick submitted forty-six charges and 
MacPherson eighteen, a large enough number for the judge to remark 
upon.
132
 The thrust of the charges asked the jury to decide whether a 
negligently constructed automobile was imminently dangerous, and 
whether or not Buick was negligent for its failure to inspect the wheels it 
put into its cars. The court specifically refused charges that would have 
had the jury impose the privity limitation on recovery.
133
 Buick‘s counsel 
wrangled with the judge for charging that the jury could find that a 
negligently constructed automobile could be imminently dangerous, and 
fought for and succeeded in obtaining an instruction that an ordinary 
automobile was not imminently dangerous.
134
 MacPherson‘s lawyer made 
sure to insist upon the classification of a negligently made automobile as 
an ‗imminently dangerous‘ machine. 
The jury awarded MacPherson $5,000.00 in damages.
135
 After the 
judge announced the verdict, various post-trial motions were made, 
including motions by the defendant to set aside the jury verdict, and for a 
new trial.
136
 The judge rejected these. Moreover, he awarded to the 
plaintiff an ―extra allowance‖ to cover costs of the trial, in the amount of 
$251.25.
137
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D. MacPherson v. Buick: En Route to the New York Court of Appeals 
On intermediate appeal, the reviewing court ruled for the plaintiff, 
rejecting every one of the defendant‘s contentions.138 The appellate court 
presented the logic of the trial judge‘s charges simply and elegantly: 
The Trial Justice charged the jury, in substance, that the defendant 
was not liable unless an automobile with a weak wheel was, to the 
defendant‘s knowledge, a dangerous machine, in which case the 
defendant owed the plaintiff the duty to inspect the wheel and see 
that it was reasonably safe for the uses intended; that if the machine 
in the condition in which it was put upon the market by the 
defendant was in itself inherently dangerous, and if the defendant 
knew that a weak wheel would make it inherently dangerous, then 
the defendant is chargeable with the knowledge of the defects to the 
extent that they could be discovered by reasonable inspection and 
testing.
139
 
The intermediate appellate court claimed that even an ordinary person 
would realize that a car with a weak wheel would be dangerous, thus 
sustaining the jury charge and verdict that such a car was imminently or 
inherently dangerous.
140
 
The intermediate appellate court harkened to a time when people would 
inspect for themselves the wood in items they purchased. Evoking the 
natural setting of caveat emptor, the court wrote: 
In the old days, a farmer who desired to have wheels made for an 
ox-cart would be apt to inspect the timber before it was painted, 
before the wheel was ironed and the defects covered up, in order 
that he might know what he was buying. . . . An ordinary man, in 
buying a pitchfork, a golf club, an axe-helve, or an oar for a boat 
will look at the timber, ―heft it‖, and otherwise endeavor to 
ascertain whether it is made of a suitable material. He is not 
satisfied with the fact that he is buying it of a reputable maker. It is 
not unreasonable to expect that the manufacturer of an automobile 
will give some attention at least to the material which enters into a 
wheel which he has purchased for use thereon.
141
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The court analogized the manufacturer to the buyer of yore who had both 
the obligation and the habit of inspecting raw materials to be used in his 
goods. As Buick performed no inspection whatsoever, there was no room 
to debate what kind of inspection would be sufficient under the law, and 
the jury‘s verdict was upheld. 
In the following excerpt from the court‘s opinion, note that while the 
appellate court‘s opinion begins by discussing the issue of the imminent or 
inherent dangerousness of an automobile with a weak wheel, its holding 
does not use the concept of ‗imminent danger‘ at all.  
We hold that under the circumstances the defendant owed a duty to 
all purchasers of its automobiles to make a reasonable inspection 
and test to ascertain whether the wheels purchased and put in use by 
it were reasonably fit for the purposes for which it used them, and if 
it fails to exercise care in that respect that it is responsible for any 
defect which would have been discovered by reasonable inspection 
or test.
142
 
This holding foreshadows Justice Cardozo‘s opinion in the final appeal in 
MacPherson. The intermediate appellate court substitutes the language of 
―reasonable fitness for purpose‖ for the concept ‗imminently dangerous‘. 
Its holding shows that the basis of the manufacturer‘s duty of care can be 
better expressed by this language than by employing the concept of 
‗imminent danger‘ to classify some products but not others.  
Nevertheless, the intermediate appellate court opinion left Buick‘s 
counsel in a difficult position. The court supported both the concept of 
‗imminently dangerous‘ in the jury charge and the jury‘s determination 
that a car with a bum wheel was imminently dangerous. Furthermore, the 
court had ruled that Buick‘s total failure to inspect was, as a matter of a 
law, a violation of the duty of reasonable inspection of an imminently 
dangerous product. Yet the holding itself was not couched in the concept 
of ‗imminent danger.‘ In its final appeal to New York‘s highest court, 
Buick decided to deemphasize the lower appellate court‘s holding, 
ignoring its language of reasonable fitness for purpose, and attacking the 
plaintiff‘s case with the traditional concept of ‗inherently dangerous.‘143 
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Buick maintained that ―an automobile is not an inherently dangerous 
article‖144 and therefore it had no liability ―to a third party in simple 
negligence.‖145 Then it took up the heart of its argument concerning 
whether being defective did not render the automobile inherently 
dangerous. This strategy immediately bogged Buick down in an effort to 
distinguish ‗imminently dangerous‘ from ‗inherently dangerous‘. Buick 
argued that the trial court correctly charged the jury that a car ―is not an 
instrumentality inherently, that is, necessarily, intrinsically or per se 
dangerous to human life.‖146 Buick next asserted that inherent danger is 
not the same as imminent danger, even if some courts used the terms 
interchangeably.
147
 Then Buick delivered its own exposition of the history 
of manufacturer liability. 
According to Buick, the ―expansion of Commerce‖ from the time of 
the founding of the Union, led courts to attempt ―to impose a liability on 
vendors or manufacturers to third parties or subsequent purchasers.‖148 
Indiscriminate imposition of liability would essentially force vendors or 
manufacturers into a contractual relationship with parties unknown to 
them, imposing all sorts of onerous duties on vendors and manufacturers, 
and putting a serious crimp in the further growth of commerce. According 
to Buick‘s brief, the law was able to prevent this undesirable result by 
creating only two classes of articles whose manufacturers and vendors had 
obligations of care beyond the privity line.
149
 One category covered 
articles ―intended for human consumption‖ and the other covered ―articles 
inherently dangerous to human life.‖150 Since cars fell into the second 
category, Buick concentrated on that one, thus eliminating the need for its 
argument to address the Thomas v. Winchester precedent. Buick explained 
how the classification of inherently dangerous articles gradually grew, 
eventually including: ―large steam boilers, or small steam boilers exposed 
in public places, highly charged water bottles, and other articles which the 
common experience of mankind demonstrated to be frequently liable to 
accident, and to cause injury to persons using them.‖151  
The brief writers presumably did not realize it, but this is the moment 
in their argument that reveals the key weakness in the concept of 
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‗inherently dangerous‘. The concept is simply too malleable and too much 
at the mercy of ever-changing circumstances. It lacks a sufficient mesh of 
the descriptive and the evaluative to permit structured, principled 
application. If automobiles with defective parts often cause accidents, then 
those automobiles, by Buick‘s own construction of the concept, are 
‗inherently dangerous‘. Buick‘s delineation unintentionally revealed the 
dispensability of the concept of ‗inherently dangerous‘. The important 
question for deciding the case was whether or not an article is likely to 
cause injury if negligently made. This is important because it is knowledge 
of that likelihood which gives rise to the obligation to take reasonable 
precautions. The ‗inherently dangerous‘ standard does not ground a reason 
for or against obligation, and it has no evaluative bite from the perspective 
of tort, an area of law concerned precisely with when obligations of care 
arise. Indeed, having given a construction that would include defective 
cars, the Buick brief attempts another characterization of the concept of 
‗inherently dangerous‘: ―Articles inherently dangerous to human life are 
those which in their very nature are calculated to cause harm to mankind. 
. . . Inherent means inborn, in the article itself.‖152 This sort of effort to 
confine the concept is doomed to failure. The telos of a carbonated bottle 
of water, if it has one, is not to harm those who pick it up. But Buick itself 
concurred with the many courts of the day that had found overcharged 
bottles to be inherently dangerous. 
Buick tried desperately to demonstrate that products with defects 
should be treated differently than products ―intrinsically‖ harmful to 
human life. The brief attempted to distinguish the concept of ‗inherently 
dangerous‘ from the concept ‗imminently dangerous,‘ arguing that the 
latter concept covers any article with a defect likely to cause serious injury 
to somebody else as opposed to those articles with danger ―inborn‖ in 
themselves. The brief reads: ―[I]f it is established than an automobile is 
not an article inherently dangerous to human life, it must not be said . . . 
that inherently and imminently have the same legal meaning.‖153 
After this rather cryptic assertion, Buick moved on to restate the rule of 
privity. Buick repeated that although the law created an exception for 
inherently dangerous articles, the exception was not applicable in the 
present suit, just as exceptions based on fraud do not apply. This might 
seem odd because the plaintiff never alleged fraud against Buick, but 
Buick used the fraud exception to distinguish cases that seemingly 
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permitted recovery based on the danger presented by a defective product. 
Essentially, Buick argued that all the precedents that override privity fall 
into either the ‗inherently dangerous‘ classification (which does not 
include defective products) or the ‗fraud‘ exception (which allows third-
party recovery in the event of defect but only if the manufacturer 
knowingly passed off the defective product). Buick‘s brief provides pages 
of authority from state courts (including New York), federal courts, and 
treatise writers all allegedly in support of these two classifications being 
the only classification that trump privity, and which confines ‗inherently 
dangerous‘ products to a short list, including boilers, charged water 
bottles, drugs, and medicines.
154 
Finally, in section three of its brief, Buick squarely addressed the 
contention it anticipated from MacPherson—namely, that the law treats 
imminently dangerous defective products in the same way as it treats 
inherently dangerous objects in that both kinds escape the privity 
limitation. Buick‘s brief called this ―the crucial point.‖155 Buick argued 
that there were two distinct concepts in play. ‗Inherent danger‘ gives rise 
to the privity exception and does not apply to automobiles, whereas 
‗imminent danger‘ does not give rise to the privity exception. Thus, 
regardless of whether a defective automobile is imminently dangerous, the 
plaintiff in this case has no cause of action against the manufacturer 
because they were not in privity. 
Buick relied heavily on a case that arose in New York federal court 
around the same time as MacPherson v. Buick. That case, Cadillac v. 
Johnson,
156
 was a negligence action based on facts very similar to 
MacPherson: a defective wheel made with hickory spokes gave way and 
plaintiff-driver suffered serious injuries.
157
 The jury returned a verdict for 
the plaintiff, which the defendant appealed. The appellate court rejected 
the idea that a consumer could recover at common law for simple 
negligence.
158
 In its decision, the Second Circuit went out of its way to 
reject the intermediate appellate New York decision in MacPherson, 
avowing, ―We are not persuaded to the contrary by the decision in 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.‖159 When Buick briefed the New York 
State Court of Appeals, it relied on Cadillac as authority for the 
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proposition that a plaintiff could not recover in a simple negligence action 
against a manufacturer unless a contractual relation between the parties 
existed.
160
 
According to Buick, the MacPherson trial court erred by using the 
words ―imminently‖ and ―inherently‖ interchangeably in its jury charge.161 
The brief argued that, in any event, whether an article belongs under one 
heading or the other is a question of law, not fact, and should not be left to 
a jury to decide.
162
 The brief then goes on to reiterate its theory on the 
distinction between inherently dangerous articles, imminently dangerous 
articles, and the role of fraud in overcoming the privity limitation.
163
 
MacPherson‘s brief to the New York Court of Appeals presents the 
procedural history of the case, including the theory of the plaintiff‘s case, 
and then narrates the events of the accident and the testimony provided by 
the experts.
164
 The brief also highlights a fact less prominently discussed at 
trial: 
The defendant published a catalogue and in a double page picture 
under the words ‗The Home of the Buick Motor Company‘ showed 
the factories of the Imperial Wheel Company, which made the 
wheel, and of the Weston-Mott Company which made the Buick 
axles.
165
 
While only a side note, the observation highlights the close relationship 
between manufacturers and parts suppliers, common both then and now. 
MacPherson‘s brief, like Buick‘s, addresses the ‗inherent‘/‗imminent‘ 
danger issue, although in a far different manner. First the MacPherson 
brief argues that ―[a]n automobile, propelled by explosive gases, certified 
and put out, as here conceded, to run at a speed of fifty miles an hour, to 
be managed by whomsoever may purchase it, is a machine inherently 
dangerous.‖166 The MacPherson brief notes that there are authorities to the 
contrary. It explicitly casts the case as an opportunity to settle the 
question, and to decide that a defective automobile is inherently 
dangerous. Then, the brief rather grandly states, ―Let us begin without any 
 
 
 160. Brief on Behalf of Appellant, supra note 143, at 9, 50. 
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juggling over definitions,‖167 yet then immediately defines ―inherently‖ as 
―inseparably‖ and ―imminently‖ as ―threateningly.‖168 Based on these 
assertions, MacPherson‘s brief claims it is ―common knowledge‖ that an 
automobile in motion is inherently dangerous.
169
 
The same malleability of the concepts ‗inherent‘ and ‗imminent‘ that 
plagued Buick‘s brief plagued the respondent‘s. Therefore, MacPherson‘s 
counsel chose to use ‗inherently dangerous‘ as the right concept to cover 
an automobile. The brief makes an interesting move in support of this 
contention. It claims that an automobile is much more like a locomotive 
than a wagon.
170
 The automobile and the locomotive go at far greater 
speeds than a wagon, and in their construction they are both more complex 
than a wagon. A license is required to run a locomotive and to drive a car, 
while none is needed to operate a wagon.
171
 In short, the automobile, like 
the locomotive, is a modern industrial machine, and the features that 
signify the dangerousness of locomotive also apply to the automobile.
172
 
After providing precedential support for this characterization of an 
automobile, the MacPherson brief takes up the privity issue. As a step 
toward conceptual engineering, the brief likens an automobile to a 
locomotive in very particular ways. It supplies some firm descriptive 
footing for thinking about the nature of the risk at stake and how tort law 
does and ought to evaluate that risk.  
According to MacPherson‘s brief, the privity requirement is merely 
technical when it comes to manufacturing chains, and if applied would 
lead to circuitous pleading and interpleading between consumers, 
manufacturers, and suppliers. The brief now begins to bear all the 
hallmarks of legal realist argument. Specifically, it rejects form over 
substantive justice, calls for the need for American courts to simplify 
proceedings to accomplish this goal, and suggests the courts adopt a public 
welfare justification for removing the privity limitation barring a plaintiff 
like MacPherson from bringing suit against a manufacturer. Finally, the 
brief makes the evaluative point that informs the emerging re-engineered 
concept of negligence: 
Surely one should not be maimed for life because of negligence in 
the construction of an automobile he has purchased, without 
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liability and satisfaction somewhere. Modern notions of decency 
cannot tolerate such a result as that. And if there is to be sure 
satisfaction it can hardly fail to attach to the manufacturer. The local 
automobile dealer, I think it may be accepted as a matter of 
common knowledge, although there are occasional exceptions, is 
usually of insufficient means to respond in damages to an amount 
sufficient to insure compensation to one injured. Either the 
manufacturer must be held liable in such case, or those maimed 
under such circumstances must abandon any thought of satisfaction 
for their injuries. Nor should the intermediate dealer be held. He is 
without fault—actual fault.173 
Note that the evaluation is embedded in circumstantial or factual context. 
It is an evaluation of responsibility, an assessment of obligation. Decency 
imposes upon the party who makes the cars the obligation to compensate 
for injuries inflicted by a negligently constructed one. There is the 
recognition that evaluations are not timeless; modern notions of decency 
are in play. Finally, the evaluation evinces a proto-Calabresian 
pragmatism, as it is sensitive to those who can realistically afford to take 
on the obligation now recognized.
174
 
Buick, the appellant, submitted a short reply brief to the Court of 
Appeals.
175
 This brief revolved almost entirely around the ‗inherently 
dangerous‘/‗imminently dangerous‘ distinction, insisting upon the fact of 
the distinction, that the case had been tried under the plaintiff‘s concession 
that an automobile is not inherently dangerous, and that MacPherson‘s 
brief to the Court of Appeals was an illicit attempt to change its theory of 
the case.
176
 The reply brief then once more goes through the litany of 
cases, insisting that each be interpreted so as to support Buick‘s case. 
 
 
 173. Id. at 23–24. 
 174. The MacPherson brief‘s treatment of one significant precedent merits attention. The brief 
writer very effectively uses the entangled concept ‗trap‘ the Devlin court used to justify ignoring the 
privity requirement. In Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470 (1882), workers who climbed upon scaffolding 
erected by another business were killed and seriously injured when the scaffolding collapsed due to 
negligent construction. The workers‘ employer was in privity with the scaffold builder, but the 
workers themselves were not. The Devlin court applied the concept of a ‗trap‘ to characterize the 
dangerously tall and faultily constructed scaffold. ‗Trap‘ covers not only a confined space or a restraint 
on movement; the concept extends to any situation that involves hidden danger, risky to the justifiedly 
unsuspecting. The danger depends on the facts about the space or the restraint. In Devlin, the fifty foot 
scaffolding created a non-obvious risk of collapse. The MacPherson brief to the New York Court of 
Appeals relies on Devlin to characterize the negligently defective automobile as also a trap, 
―imperiling the life of any person who might go in it.‖ Respondent‘s Brief, supra note 164, at 26.  
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E. MacPherson v. Buick: Justice Cardozo 
In MacPherson v. Buick II, Justice Cardozo‘s opinion for the majority 
is conspicuously short compared with the lengthy briefs submitted to the 
New York Court of Appeals. Cardozo indicates at the start of the opinion 
that the plaintiff at trial, MacPherson, will prevail, when Cardozo quotes 
Thomas v. Winchester: ―The defendant‘s negligence . . . put human life in 
imminent danger.‖177 What was not apparent was the way Cardozo would 
reach this result, discarding ‗imminent danger‘—an unsuccessful 
entangled concept—in favor of reengineering a more reliable entangled 
concept, ‗negligence‘. 
Cardozo‘s opinion never referenced the ‗inherent danger‘/‗imminent 
danger‘ distinction to which the defendant devoted so much attention 
during all phases of the trial. After some discussion of Thomas, which 
Cardozo read to stand for the proposition that where ―danger is to be 
foreseen, there is a duty to avoid injury,‖178 Cardozo declared the case ―a 
landmark of the law.‖179 He then turned immediately to the line of cases 
that the attorneys and courts had been discussing throughout the 
proceedings in MacPherson. For each case, he showed that the courts are 
always applying the principle that where there is a danger to be foreseen, 
there is a duty to avoid injury. Sometimes it is applied more appropriately, 
sometimes less, sometimes more generously, sometimes less; nevertheless, 
the same principle is always applied. He concedes that Devlin v. Smith and 
Statler v. Ray, the most recent cases, may ―have extended the rule of 
Thomas v. Winchester.‖180 Exercising the prerogative of a jurisdiction‘s 
highest court, Cardozo states, ―If so, this court is committed to the 
extension.‖181 
Cardozo‘s factual summaries always emphasize the foreseeable risk of 
injury to persons even if they were not the immediate purchaser of the 
item. This is appellate engineering at its clearest. Through a recapitulation 
of cases everybody thinks relevant to the one at hand, Cardozo gives 
examples of the entanglement of the phenomenon of commercial 
distribution and the obligation that arises from being the creator of known 
and foreseeable risk in that context. 
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Cardozo relied on English authority to clarify how of the concept of 
‗duty‘ would be restructured in the context of manufactured goods. He 
found in Heaven v. Pender, penned by Lord Esher, a conception of duty 
that sets aside the privity limitation: 
Whenever one person supplies goods, or machinery, or the like, for 
the purpose of their being used by another person under such 
circumstances that every one of ordinary sense would, if he thought, 
recognize at once that unless he used ordinary care and skill with 
regard to the condition of the thing supplied or the mode of 
supplying it, there will be danger of injury to the person or property 
of him for whose use the thing is supplied, and who is to use it, a 
duty arises to use ordinary care and skill as the condition or manner 
of supplying such thing.
182 
Cardozo noted that Lord Esher‘s associates did not unanimously adopt his 
views and that Lord Esher may not even be offering accepted law in 
England. Instead, Cardozo quotes Lord Esher because he stated the ―tests 
and standards of [New York] law.‖183 Cardozo then announced the holding 
of his opinion: 
We hold, then, that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester is not 
limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, to things 
which in their normal operation are implements of destruction. If 
the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life 
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of 
danger. . . . If to the element of danger there is added knowledge 
that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and 
used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the 
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it 
carefully.
184
 
Cardozo‘s holding accomplishes two things. First, he abolishes the privity 
limitation. Second, he abolishes the need for the concepts of ‗imminent 
danger‘ and ‗inherent danger‘. Rather than try to shore up either or both, 
he dispenses with the pair in favor of engineering negligence‘s duty of 
care with a focus on foreseeable, knowable risk. 
Cardozo himself could not have foreseen how his engineering of 
‗negligence‘ in MacPherson would eventually lead to the concept‘s 
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demise in deciding liability for manufacturing defects. Future courts 
would do to ‗negligence‘ what Cardozo did to ‗privity‘. After Cardozo‘s 
opinion, judges in California and New Jersey engineered and used more 
apt entangled concepts to replace ‗negligence‘ as a conceptual tool for 
considering manufacturer liability for product defects. They were able to 
introduce principles of liability without fault precisely because Cardozo 
had engineered ‗negligence‘, by clearly intertwining the descriptive and 
evaluative features of the modern manufacturing system and the 
relationship of injurers to victims, to establish that a duty of care extended 
from the former to the latter. By the 1950s and 1960s, courts realized that 
this very entanglement called for a shift from manufacturer liability based 
on ‗negligence‘ to one that did not require a showing of manufacturer 
fault. 
III. ENTANGLEMENT, ‗COMMERCE‘, ‗TAX‘, AND THE AFFORDABLE 
HEALTH CARE ACT 
In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (‗ACA‘)185 
became law. The Act requires various measures from states, insurance 
providers, and individuals, as well as the federal government, in order to 
ensure much wider access to health care insurance, and thus to affordable 
health care. The measures range from insisting that insurance companies 
extend coverage to people with ‗preexisting conditions‘ to mandating that, 
with some exceptions, individuals purchase health insurance or remit a 
payment with their federal income tax return (the ‗Individual Mandate‘). 
My aim is not to undertake a full analysis of the ACA or the legal and 
political reaction it has provoked, rather, I will review the opinions in the 
recent Supreme Court case
186
 where the Court decided that the Individual 
Mandate is not unconstitutional. This case gives us a timely example of 
how the Supreme Court engineers entangled constitutional concepts, just 
as other appellate courts law courts engineer entangled common law 
concepts. A brief consideration of Supreme Court decisions related to the 
Commerce Clause demonstrates how an appellate court, here the Supreme 
Court, engineers concepts horizontally over time as well as vertically 
through adjudication of a single dispute. The majority and minority 
opinions in the ACA also illustrate competing constructions of the 
entangled legal concept ‗commerce‘, and how that competition can yield 
results that surprise those focused on the particular case, but are perhaps 
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less surprising when considered from the vantage point of the larger 
appellate judicial practice of engineering entangled concepts. 
A. Glance at the Prior Engineering of ‗Commerce‘ 
The Commerce Clause
187
 of the United States Constitution has always 
received judicial attention. The United States Supreme Court has 
engineered and re-engineered the concept of commerce, as introduced in 
the U.S. Constitution, which has then been used repeatedly by Congress as 
the basis for enacting national law. Starting with Gibbons v. Ogdon,
188
 one 
of the earliest adjudications under the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice 
Marshall implicitly realized that the concept of commerce as used in the 
Constitution demanded engineering, specifically engineering keyed to the 
entangled nature of the concept as a United States constitutional legal 
concept. In Gibbons, Marshall worked with the public welfare values—the 
collective benefit—American federalism attaches to a single regulatory 
authority and the establishment of a national market, respectively, and the 
empirical role of aquatic navigation as it bore on those values to develop 
the legal concept of commerce. His engineering led him to decide that 
Congress could regulate all commercial aquatic navigation, even if the 
facts of a particular case involve a specific location upon those waters 
within a single state. Marshall wrote: 
The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution [sic] 
being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of 
definition, to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary 
to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee 
would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of 
commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation. This 
would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of 
its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is 
something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial 
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, 
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that 
intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating 
commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning 
navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of 
the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to 
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prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual 
employment of buying and selling, or of barter.
189
 
Marshall then devotes much of his opinion to explaining that the concept 
of commerce includes commercial navigation, relying on the framers‘ 
understanding of commerce in a federated United States and their reasons 
for granting power over commerce among the states to the federal 
government.
190
 In this way, he articulates, explains, and engineers the 
already entangled concept of commerce as it appears in the United States 
Constitution, identifying much of the mixture of evaluative and empirical 
factors that have animated the Supreme Court‘s re-engineering of 
commerce to the present day. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court 
attempted to engineer the concept of ‗commerce‘ by creating a principled 
line between the concepts ‗local‘ and ‗interstate‘ or between ‗direct‘ and 
‗indirect‘ effects on interstate commerce.191 These efforts to rely on 
subsidiary entangled concepts suffered from problems similar to those that 
plagued the term ‗inherently dangerous‘. When Congress tried to regulate 
wages and hours or child labor, the Court did not look to the national 
commercial implications of these matters, but instead relied on intuitions 
about what they thought was ‗local‘ or what counted as a ‗direct‘ effect on 
commerce.
192
 In an effort to pin down descriptive reach without careful 
attention to evaluative concerns, the Court‘s formal categories tended to 
look both unprincipled and detached from the empirical realities of 
modern markets and modern government. 
The New Deal famously changed the Court‘s approach to engineering 
‗commerce‘. After President Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s court-packing 
threat,
193
 the Court reexamined the nature of a national market regulated 
by a single authority in a modern economy. Starting with NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel,
194
 the Court recognized the interdependence of labor 
 
 
 189. Id. at 189–90. 
 190. Id. at 190–96. 
 191. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546–51 (1935). See also Barry Cushman, Formalism and 
Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2000). 
 192. See, e.g., E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 42–43. 
 193. See Roosevelt‘s ―Court Packing‖ Plan, JUDICIARY.SENATE.GOV, http://www.judiciary 
.senate.gov/about/history/CourtPacking.cfm (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (describing the Supreme 
Court‘s original invalidation of New Deal legislation, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt‘s effort to 
change the composition of the Court to ensure justices more sympathetic to such legislation, and the 
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light of the Great Depression and the circumstances that led to it). 
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relations at one location and the entire national supply chain involved in 
steel production spread throughout the country.
195
 Once the Court covered 
this sort of interdependence with the concept of ‗commerce‘, the Court 
upheld a variety of Congressional actions. Of special note is Wickard v. 
Fillburn,
196
 where a single farmer exceeding the allotted acreage 
permissible for him to farm was penalized under the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938. Wickard contended that his activity had virtually 
no effect on interstate commerce because he was raising wheat for his own 
consumptions on the extra acreage; thus he was not involved in commerce, 
let alone interstate commerce.
197
 Without considering the Court‘s previous 
engineering of ‗commerce‘, Wickard‘s position may seem plausible. But 
the Supreme Court upheld the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as 
applied to Wickard. The Court recognized that concept of ‗commerce‘ 
extended to national markets and that some noncommercial, intrastate 
activity could, in the aggregate, substantially affect national markets.
198
 
Note that the Court did not rule that Wickard‘s cultivation of wheat for 
personal consumption was itself commerce; the concept does not expand 
in that direction.
199
 Rather, the Court decided that the connection between 
that activity and commerce gave sufficiently substantial reason to 
Congress to regulate Wickard in the service of interstate commerce.
200
 
In Wickard, the Court used values borne of American federalism to 
expand federal power. But, values rooted in American federalism can also 
tilt toward protecting states from encroachments by the federal 
government. In Lopez v. United States
201
 and then in Morrison v. United 
States,
202
 the Court struck down federal criminal statutes that regulated, 
respectively, gun possession near schools and domestic violence against 
women. In both cases, the Court based its invalidation of the respective 
statutes on federalism values. The Court rejected the claim that 
‗commerce‘ could be defined so broadly as to reach these two areas of 
conduct, not because they do not affect national markets, but because the 
conduct in question seemed to the court to fall squarely within traditional 
jurisdiction of the states in their exercise of their police powers.
203
 The 
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Court insisted that dual-sovereignty values of federalism, according to 
which neither the central government nor the states should wholly swallow 
the other‘s authority, demanded protection of the sphere in which the 
states exert police power to the exclusion of Congressional action.
204
 For 
present purposes, the point is to note that just as the Court has used the 
entanglement of federalism values and circumstances of specific cases to 
engineer ‗commerce‘ in a way that undergirds broad federal power so too 
it has used entanglement to engineer ‗commerce‘ to deny such support. As 
in Wickard, the Lopez and Morrison Courts re-engineered boundaries of 
‗commerce‘ by attending to the intermeshed values and facts involved in 
the concept and the circumstances of the case. 
B. The ACA and the Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate 
The original lawsuits over the constitutionality of the ACA seemed to 
set the stage for another precedent-setting engineering of the constitutional 
concept of commerce. Detractors introduced a distinction novel to 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the activity/inactivity distinction, as the 
basis for shaping the concept of commerce to exclude the federal 
government from in any way requiring individuals to purchase health 
insurance. Supporters relied on a more conventional economic 
understanding of markets to shape the concept of commerce to take 
account of the particularly glaring and pernicious risks of free-riding and 
moral hazard when it comes to health insurance and health care and that 
encompasses a requirement that individuals obtain health insurance. 
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
205
 the 
ACA case that reached the Supreme Court, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate. The Court‘s opinion, penned 
by Chief Justice Robets, denied the mandate‘s constitutionality under the 
Commerce Clause, but upheld its constitutinality under the Taxing Power, 
maintaining that Congress may tax those who do not purchase health 
insurance, so long as that tax does not amount to a fine.
206
 Five justices 
agreed on both holdings, but a different set of four agreed on each. The 
four justices who joined the Chief Justice‘s opinion for the Court agreed 
that the mandate could be regarded as a tax within Congress‘ authority to 
impose, but they also endorsed a concept of commerce that would have 
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supported upholding the mandate on Commerce Clause grounds as well.
207
 
Four dissenting justices rejected the treatment of the mandate as a tax, 
insisting that the constitutionality of the measure depended solely on its 
legitimacy under the Commerce Clause, which they denied.
208
 From a 
precedential perspective, therefore, National Federation does not provide 
a definitive engineering of ‗commerce‘. It does, however, include two 
rival engineering efforts. 
First, consider Justice Ginsberg‘s defense of the individual mandate as 
a constitutionally permitted regulation of interstate commerce. Her point 
of departure is 1937, when the Supreme Court first ―recognized Congress‘ 
large authority to set the Nation‘s course in the economic and social 
welfare realm.‖209 The circumstances and welfare outlook of that era 
inform Ginsberg‘s engineering of ‗commerce‘. She notes at the outset that 
the 1937 Court defended ―Congress‘ efforts to regulate the national 
economy in the interest of those who labor to sustain it.‖210 This 
observation immediately entangles individual welfare and regulation of 
the national economy. The needs of individual laborers and the very 
existence of a nationwide market-economy must be considered jointly. 
Such an economy cannot exist without protecting the welfare of individual 
laborers, and it is through the work of healthy, financially secure 
individuals that a national economy thrives. 
Ginsberg then turns to what she regards as the relevant current 
circumstances facing Congress when passing the ACA by describing the 
magnitude and extent of the ―national market for health-care products and 
services.‖211 Next, she details the ways in which this market differs from 
others markets by demonstrating how an individual's decision not to 
purchase health insurance has affirmative ramifications that echo across 
the national market for health-care products and services.
212
 Then she 
takes up the empirical matter of why the states, acting in their individual 
capacity, cannot solve the national problems of free-riding and unfair cost-
 
 
 207. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg also questioned the necessity of 
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shifting in the market for health-care products and services. She explains 
that any state that tries health-care market reform on its own makes itself 
unduly attractive to the unhealthy, setting off a cycle of increasing 
premiums and taxes likely to provoke healthier people to exit the state, an 
exit that would, in turn, further hike premiums and taxes.
213
 
Ginsberg sees the health-care market as national in scope and its 
market failures as necessitating nation-wide solutions. She maintains that 
the measures the ACA adopts—guaranteed issue of insurance, community 
rating, and the individual mandate—are necessarily interrelated so as to 
specifically target problems that arise because of the nature of health care 
as it is provided in this country and the collective action problem faced by 
the separate States who might attempt reform.
214
 Under Ginsberg‘s 
engineering, the constitutional concept of ‗commerce‘ encompasses a 
complex interplay of market forces all bearing on individual welfare. 
Congressionally authorized federal intervention at any stage thus qualifies 
as a legitimate regulation of commerce.  
This conception of ‗commerce‘ is in contrast with Chief Justice 
Roberts‘ approach. Roberts opens his opinion for the Court with an 
extended discussion of state sovereignty and the limited powers of the 
federal government.
215
 He leads with quotations from the Marshall Court 
of the first quarter of the 19th century.
216
 Against that background, Roberts 
takes up the issues posed in the case itself. When he turns to the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate, he acknowledges the market 
failures that have plagued the national health-care market.
217
 But despite 
this recognition, he rejects the individual mandate as an appropriate 
exercise of power under the Commerce Clause on the ground that the 
individual mandate does not regulate ―commercial activity,‖ but instead 
tries to ―create‖ it by compelling individuals to buy health insurance.218 
In Roberts‘ view, the world that follows from a concept of commerce 
that permits Congress to call upon individuals to buy health insurance is a 
world in which Congress could force individuals to purchase any good or 
service whatsoever.
219
 Roberts casts a Ginsberg-like version of 
‗commerce‘ as one that cannot distinguish between different markets 
 
 
 213. 132 S. Ct. at 2612. 
 214. Id. at 2614–15. 
 215. Id. at 2577–80. 
 216. Id. at 2577. 
 217. Id. at 2585. 
 218. Id. at 2587. 
 219. Id. at 2589. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
102 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 5:61 
 
 
 
 
depending on the nature of the good or service traded.
220
 Thus, according 
to Roberts, that concept of commerce would license Congress to supplant 
the individual states as the sovereigns with ―police powers,‖ the authority 
to act in the interests of citizens and residents‘ welfare.221 Moreover, 
Roberts insists upon the constitutional unacceptability of any engineering 
of ‗commerce‘ that does not clearly and definitively respect state 
sovereignty and the states as the repository of police powers. He states: 
―The Commerce Clause is not a general license to regulate an individual 
from cradle to grave . . . . Any police power to regulate individuals as such 
. . . remains vested in the States.‖222 Where Ginsberg engineers 
‗commerce‘ to highlight the necessity for national intervention in national 
markets, Roberts would prefer to engineer ‗commerce‘ to minimize the 
reach of the federal government, making sure to interpose the states. 
Although Roberts rejects Ginsberg‘s engineering of ‗commerce‘, he 
does not conclude that Congress has no constitutionally enumerated power 
that authorizes the specific Congressional regulation in question, the 
individual mandate. Instead, Roberts examines the Constitution‘s granting 
to the federal Congress the power ―To lay and collect taxes . . . to . . . 
provide for . . . the general welfare of the United States.‖223 
The ACA never calls the payment to the government for failure to 
purchase health insurance a ―tax.‖ The four justices, who would have ruled 
the individual mandate unconstitutional, consider this choice of language 
to forestall any further consideration of whether the payment is, 
nevertheless, a tax.
224
 But the Chief Justice grasps the difference between a 
label and a concept, and argues for asking ―whether the shared 
responsibility payment falls within Congress‘s taxing power, 
‗[d]isregarding the designation of the exaction, and viewing its substance 
and application.‘‖225 The label does not determine the concept in play; 
rather, the evidence for which concept best covers the payment relates to 
what it involves empirically and purposefully. Entanglement guides 
conceptual engineering. 
Roberts describes looking beyond the choice of word as a ―functional‖ 
approach.
226
 He considers another Supreme Court case where the Court 
looked to ―practical characteristics‖ to decide that a payment labeled a 
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―tax‖ was, conceptually speaking, actually a penalty.227 Robert‘s 
exploration of the ‗tax‘/‗penalty‘ distinction displays sensitivity to how 
empirical and evaluative overtones inextricably inform one another in each 
concept. He considers enforcement and collection methods, whether the 
payment presupposes intentional wrongdoing, and whether classic 
criminal sanctions or measures are involved.
228
 These considerations, 
brought to bear on the ―shared responsibility payment,‖ bring it within the 
scope of ‗tax‘ rather than ‗penalty‘.229 Roberts insists that, ―[w]hile the 
individual mandate clearly aims to induce the purchase of health 
insurance, it need not be read to declare that failing to do so is 
unlawful.‖230 The payment to be collected by the IRS from those who do 
not purchase health insurance lacks the coercive, stigmatizing flavor of 
criminal punishments; one can lawfully choose to make the payment 
rather than buy insurance. 
The turn to ‗tax‘ made it possible for the Chief Justice to find common 
ground with four of his colleagues, despite their sharp rejection of his 
treatment of ‗commerce.‘ The concept of commerce proved to be too 
fraught with competing views of the relevant factual-evaluative 
considerations for that concept to lend itself to an agreed-upon 
engineering. Consequently, National Federation teaches us something 
important about entangled legal concepts: they come in sets or clusters. 
When one concept cannot be engineered to garner sufficient judicial 
endorsement, this can pave the way for another entangled concept to come 
into play, a concept that at first may not have seemed to be important to 
deciding a case. The ACA case illustrates what can happen when one 
entangled concept comes to lend itself to being engineered in radically 
different ways, specifically when judicial users of the concept understand 
the mesh of fact and value so differently that it drives them to see the same 
measure as clearly within or clearly outside the boundaries of ‗commerce‘. 
When judges are not able to agree on how to further engineer the 
entanglement, the concept gets sidelined, and the decision in the case 
forces the use and further engineering of another concept entirely, in this 
case ‗tax‘. 
Having used the MacPherson litigation to illustrate how state appellate 
courts engineer entangled concepts within a single case involving the 
common law, this article aims in this discussion to illustrate how the 
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Supreme Court acts similarly while engineering, over time, entangled 
concepts featured in the Constitutional text. This has circumscribed my 
analysis of the decision and opinions in National Federation. A more 
comprehensive study would examine later twentieth century civil rights 
cases decided under the Commerce Clause and would explore other 
instances of federal judicial conceptual engineering of ‗tax‘. The current 
analysis shows that both the state appellate courts and the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognize and utilize entanglement when engineering legal 
concepts. Sensitivity to and engagement with entanglement to achieve 
practicable legal concepts is the hallmark of appellate adjudication in the 
United States, whether the adjudication concerns constitutional law or 
common law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Quantum mechanics represented a departure from classical physics 
because quantum mechanics forced recognition of entanglement in the 
physical world. Similarly, appreciating how courts attend, and must attend, 
to description and evaluation when they discard or rework legal concepts, 
points legal analysis away from the more traditional commitment to a 
fact/value divide held by analytic philosophers and some jurisprudential 
scholars. Schrodinger maintained that we can understand the physical 
world more fully (if not definitely) when we accept the phenomenon of 
entanglement rather than trying to root our knowledge in an understanding 
of entangled objects behaving in isolation from one another. Analogously, 
this article maintains that we can better understand the law if we accept 
that legal concepts entangle fact and value, and root our analysis of law in 
examining specific entanglements engineered by courts over time. 
Continually applying and engineering entangled legal concepts, 
appellate courts exercise great legal power. Appellate adjudication 
structures simultaneously our perception and our evaluation of 
circumstances. With entangled concepts, appellate courts taxonomize the 
landscape of our disputes. In turn, these taxonomies decide the issues at 
stake. While the concepts and taxonomies impose internal constraints on 
what can be done with them, or done persuasively, the engineer can 
structure and restructure both concepts and taxonomies, thereby making 
powerful differences in how cases get resolved. For Buick, the decision in 
MacPherson meant a transformation in its business model. A relatively 
fledgling industry had to bear either the costs of improving safety or 
paying damages in negligence. For drivers, cars got safer but also more 
expensive. Supreme Court decisions about ‗commerce‘ order relations 
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between states, the federal legislature, and citizens, an ordering that 
influences almost every aspect of life in the United States. 
Despite the call for and the need for law students to learn to deal with 
all sorts of legal processes and materials, appellate cases have proven to be 
an enduring part of the law school curriculum. Understanding appellate 
adjudication as the engineering of entangled legal concepts both explains 
and justifies this staying power. Coming to understand how entangled 
legal concepts are engineered, even explicitly engaging in reverse 
engineering, is not only an intriguing intellectual exercise, it is also 
instruction in a craft, perhaps even an art, uniquely performed by lawyers. 
Furthermore, because of the tendency of entangled legal concepts to 
migrate between statutes and cases, lawyers working with the former have 
as much need to understand the nature and inner workings of entangled 
concepts as do lawyers who deal more with latter. Indeed, an appreciation 
of the ubiquity of entangled legal concepts in legal materials might help us 
transcend the pedagogical dichotomy between teaching statutes, which is 
often equated with public law, and cases, which is often equated with 
private law. Appellate courts engineer entangled legal concepts used in 
both arenas. What this article accomplishes is sufficient to suggest that a 
focus on cases, or a certain kind of focus on them, is not just a holdover 
from a worn out tradition in legal pedagogy, but is, rather, a necessary part 
of understanding the American legal system and thereby American law. 
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